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ABSTRACT
Real exchange rates between the yen and dollar based on general price
indexes overestimate the competitiveness of the United States relative to
Japan. High productivity growth in the traded sector of the Japanese economy
results in a continuous fall in the prices of traded goods relative to
nontraded goods in Japan. In order to keep U.S. traded goods competitive, the
real exchange rate based on general price series like the GDP deflator or the
CPI index must continually fall resulting in a real appreciation of the yen.
This paper provides estimates of how far real exchange rates based on
general price series would have had to fall over the 1973—83 period in order
to keep U.S. traded goods competitive. The real exchange rate based on GDP
deflators, for example, would have had to fall by 38% relative to the real
exchange rate based on unit labor costs in the traded sector. The GDP series
remained roughly constant over the period, thus giving the misleading
impression that U.S. goods were still competitive despite a sharp rise in the
relative price of U.S. traded goods. The paper also provides estimates of the
relative wage changes which would have to occur to restore the competitiveness
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The recent misalignment of the dollar relative to the yen has obscured
the effects of a longer—term influence on the relative competitiveness of the
two economies, productivity growth in Japan. For the past few decades,
productivity growth has been much more rapid in Japan than in the United
States. Such a gap in productivity performance would not ordinarily affect
real exchange rates except that productivity growth is concentrated in the
traded sectors of both economies. Thus through time, the prices of' traded
relative to nontraded goods must adjust to reflect productivity gains, but
this adjustment is much more extensive in Japan. As a result, the U.S.
general price level must continually fall relative to the Japanese price
level, when both are measured in a common currency, just to keep U.S. traded
goods competitive.
In the extensive literature on the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory
of exchange rates, a number of studies have cited productivity differentials
between the nontraded and traded sectors of economies as a prime cause of
deviations between any exchange rate and its PPP value. Several of these
studies, including Balassa (19614, 1973), De Vries (1968), Clague and Tanzi
(1972), and Officer (1976b), have reported empirical tests of' this phenomenon,
but have differed widely in their conclusions about whether productivity
differentials explain deviations from PPP.1 Hsieh's (1982) recent study using
time series rather than cross section data, however, has provided strong
evidence supporting the role of productivity differentials.2
The real exchange rates used in the present study, defined as the nominal
exchange rate (yen/dollar) adjusted for the relative prices of U.S. and
Japanese goods, measure departures from PPP defined in terms of severalalternative price indexes. This study, however, is less concerned with
whether PPP holds or does not hold than with assessing the quantitative
effects of productivity differentials between the United States and Japan on
the alternative real exchange rates between the yen and dollar.3 The rapid
productivity growth in the traded sector of' the Japanese economy requires a
continuing adjustment of real exchange rates between the yen and dollar
measured in terms of general price indexes to <eep U.S. goods competitive with
Japanese goods. Similarly, the sharp changes in the prices of raw materials
since 1973, which have affected the U.S. and Japanese economies in different
ways, also require adjustments in real exchange rates.
Movements in real exchange rates over time are influenced by numerous
short term demand factors in addition to the supply factors emphasized in this
paper. The differential movement between two real exchange rates, however,
should be primarily influenced by supply factors such as productivity
differentials rather than short term demand factors. For that reason, the
expressions we develop below measure the real exchange rate based on one price
series relative to that based on an alternative price series. In the case of
the United States and Japan, supply factors lead to a widening gap between
real exchange rates based on the consumer price index or wholesale price index
and those based on traded goods alone. Estimating the magnitude of this gap
is important since the relative competitiveness of these two economies is
often determined by examining movements in real exchange rates based on the
broader price indexes. The analysis will show that any appreciation of the
yen large enough to restore real exchange rates based on such indexes to their
levels prior to the recent misalignment would fall far short of restoring U.S.
traded goods to their previous levels of competitiveness. For the same
reasons, both nominal and real wages in the United States would have to
-2—decline relative to those in Japan just to restore previous levels of
competitiveness.
The paper is also concerned with productivity performance within the
manufacturing sector alone and its effects on relative prices within that
sector. The analysis shows that the differentials in productivity growth
between the United States and Japan at the industry level are highly
correlated with the rates at which relative prices change within these same
industries. Because these productivity changes have been so different across
industries within manufacturing, with Japanese productivity growth exceeding
U.S. growth by widely differing margins depending on the industry, the
relative competitiveness of individual industries has changed radically. This
would continue to be true even if the real exchange rate for manufactured
goods as a whole were restored to historical levels.
The first section of the paper develops equations for real exchange rates
defined in terms of value added deflators, relative unit labor costs, and
general price indexes. These equations relate real exchange rates to
productivity differentials in the riontraded and traded sectors of each economy
and, in the case of general price indexes, to the real prices of raw
materials. The empirical section of the paper begins with an analysis of how
much real exchange rates based on the GDP deflator and consumer price index
must diverge from those based on the prices of traded goods in order for the
two economies to remain competitive. The next part exaniines the implications
of these movements in real exchange rates for relative wages in the two
countries. In the final part of the paper, disaggregated data for
manufacturing are used to examine the productivity and relative price behavior
of individual industries.
—3—SECTORAL PRODUCTION PATTERNS AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES
Real exchange rates based on alternative price indexes can diverge
sharply when there are changes in productivity and relative prices within
national economies. This section develops expressions for several real
exchange rates to show how they are affected by such supply factors. The real
exchange rates range from one based on the value added deflator for traded
goods to a broader series based on the consumer price index.
Output and prices
We begin by outlining a simple production structure which distinguishes
between gross output and value added and which divides output into traded and
nontraded sectors. The production and gross output in one sector is assumed
to be separable into value added and two types of inputs, raw materials and
the output of the other sector. For simplicity, all production functions are
assumed to be of the Cobb—Douglas form, although the expressions developed
below could be interpreted as linearizations of a CES production function.
Equations la (or ib) express value added in the traded (nontraded) sector, VT,
as a function of employment in that sector, LT, and capital, KT, as well as a























All variables are expressed in logs with their differences interpreted as
percentage changes in the underlying variables. Equation ic expresses grossoutput in the traded sector, ZT, as a function of value added in that sector
as well as output in the nontraded sector used in the traded sector, ZNT, and
the input of raw materials, 1T Equation id expresses gross output in the
nontraded sector, ZN, in analogous fashion. This specification, which allows
the output of one sector to serve as an input in the other sector, is
especially necessary in the case of traded goods since (nontraded) services
often constitute a significant proportion of the final value of traded goods.
Parallel to these production functions are a set of price equations which
implicitly define the value added deflators for each sector. The price of
gross output in the traded (nontraded) sector, T' is a function of the value
added deflator for that sector, the gross output price in the other sector,
and the price of raw materials.







Becausethe price equations are dual to the production functions, the same
production parameters appear in the production and price equations. These
equations suggest that gross output prices can diverge from their value added
counterparts either because of price developments in the other sector or
changes in raw materials prices.
We are also interested in the relationship between the value added
deflator, on the one hand, and wages and productivity, on the other hand. The
marginal productivity relationships derived from la and lb give such a
relationship, provided that we assume that the markups of prices over marginal
costs are constant:
—5—(3a) VT WT -HT
(3b) VN =WN
-
Equation(3a) relates VT to wages in the traded sector, WT, and to




This productivity variable, HT, reflects not only the productivity factor in
the production function, hTt, but also the capital deepening factor,
KT —LT.It is this measure of productivity which affects value added prices,
and hence the relative competitiveness of economies. Similarly, equation 3b
relates value added in the nontraded sector to wages and productivity in that
sector.
The value added deflators in the two sectors together make up the value
added deflator for the economy as a whole, P, which is defined as follows:
(14) gP +(1—g)P
We choose to define the value added deflator as a weighted average (a
geometric average in levels of the sectoral prices) of the sectoral deflators
for simplicity even though in practice this equation must be regarded as only
an approximation to the deflator series appearing in the national income
accounts.
Real exchange rates: GDP deflators
The first series for the real exchange rate which are of interest are
those based on the GDP deflator as a whole and the deflator for traded goods
alone.
—6—Rv = + X—
R +X—P
VT VT VT'
We define these two series for the yen—dollar exchange rate, X, where the
starred variables represent those of the United States and the unstarred
variables those of Japan. (Japan thus is the "home country"). Equation (5)
expresses the aggregate real exchange rate relative to the real exchange rate
for traded goods as the difference of two relative prices: the relative price
of nontraded to traded goods in the United States and the corresponding
relative price in Japan.
(5) R —R - — — (p —p
V VT -' VN VT' b'VN VT
The coefficients, g and g*, represent the share of nontraded goods in total
value added. The equation shows that a rise in nontraded relative to traded
prices in Japan leads to a real appreciation of the yen in terms of the GDP
deflator as a whole relative to the traded goods deflator. Thus the yen has
to appreciate in terms of the aggregate index in order for U.S. traded goods
to remain competitive. We later provide estimates of' how large that
appreciation has to be.
The real exchange rate for traded goods alone can be expressed in terms
of relative wages and relative productivity if we use equations 3a and its










The expression in brackets on the right side of equation 6 represents relative
unit labor costs (in this case, in the traded sector alone), RULCT.
—7—Substituting this expression into equation 5 along with the expressions for













This equation states that the aggregate real exchange rate (that based on the
GDP deflator) is influenced by two factors: relative unit labor costs in the
traded sectors of the United States and Japan and unit labor costs in one
sector of each national economy relative to the other sector.If unit labor
costs in the traded and nontraded sectors of each country move together, then
the real exchange rate will follow relative unit labor costs in the traded
sectors of the two countries. But if, for example, there is a faster rate of
growth of productivity in the traded sector of Japan, then the real exchange
rate of the yen will have to appreciate relative to RULCT in order to keep the
traded sector of the United States competitive. The relatively greater
productivity in the traded sector of Japan will induce higher wages in that
sector, and in the nontraded sector as well unless the labor market is
segmented. As a result, the relative price of nontraded goods will rise in
Japan, thus pushing up the GDP deflator relative to traded prices or unit
labor costs in the traded sector. If the yen depreciates in nominal terms
enough to keep the real exchange rate based on the GDP deflator constant,
Japanese traded goods will gain a price advantage. To keep U.S. traded goods
competitive, therefore, the yen has to appreciate in real terms when measured
relative to the GDP deflator (i.e., Rv has to fall relative to
Real exchange rates: final goods prices
The real exchange rates that have received the most attention recently
are not those based on GDP deflators, but on final goods prices. The two most
-8-frequently cited are the real exchange rates based on the consumer price index
(CPI) and wholesale price index (WPI). In this section we develop expressions
for two real exchange rates, one defined in terms of the final price of traded
goods alone and another defined in terms of a general price index.
We begin by defining general price indexes for final goods, F and
consisting of domestic traded and nontraded goods, traded goods originating
from the other country, and traded goods originating from third countries













=1and similarly for the foreign country
coefficients. and P may be considered idealized forms of the consumer
price index (with geometric weighting). The real exchange rate defined in
terms of these general price indexes, RE r +X—F'
can be expressed in













Accordingto this equation, RE is affected by the relative prices of traded
goods originating from the United States and Japan, world prices relative to
U.S. prices (although only to the extent that the coefficients of third
country goods differ between the two countries),6 and by two terms
representing sectoral relative prices in the two countries.
To see how RF varies relative to real exchange rates defined for traded
goods alone, we first express T and in terms of value added deflators and








where c11 r CT1/C, c12 = (cT2cNl)/C, c13 r (cT3 +cT2cN3)/C,
C =1 -cT2cN?
>
0,and C11+ C12 ÷ c3 1.The coefficients c2 (j=1, 2, 3)aredefined
analogously. Using equation lOa and its counterpart for the foreign country,
we obtain an expression explaining the movement of RT relative to Ri, the
real exchange rate based on gross output prices for traded goods
(P +X— relative to that based on value added deflators for traded
goods.
(11 R -R _c*(P* ..P*...c (p —P






According to this equation, there are two sets of influences on RT -Rvi:the
relative price of nontraded to traded goods in each country, reflecting
primarily the bias in productivity growth between sectors, and the real price
of raw materials (in terms of traded goods) in both countries.
We can now express the real exchange rate based on the general price

















where c1 r (1 —a)c2
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According to this equation, the gap between RF and RVT is influenced by
changes in the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods or in the real
prices of raw materials as well as by changes in the relative prices of traded
goods. The yen appreciates more in terms of the broader index if there is a
relatively greater rise in nontraded relative to traded prices in Japan. The
reasoning is the same as in the comparison between the real exchange rate
based on the GDP deflator and the narrower deflator for traded goods. In
order to keep the United States competitive in its traded sector, the yen must
have a real appreciation in terms of the broader general price index. A rise
in the real price of raw materials in Japan (for a given real price of raw
materials in the United States) also causes a greater appreciation in the
broader index than in that based on traded goods alone. Finally, the gap
between RF and RVT widens if there is an increase in the real exchange rate
for traded goods, RT. (The effects of a rise in third country prices are
indeterminate).
In the next section, we will use these expressions for the various real
exchange rates to interpret the movements of the yen relative to the dollar
over the past twenty years. We begin by examining the GDP deflators derived
from the national income accounts.
REAL EXCHANGE RATES IN PRACTICE
The OECD has published national accounts statistics defined on a
consistent basis for the years 19614 to 1983. We have used the real and
nominal GDP statistics disaggregated by type of activity to generate series
-11-for traded and nontraded goods. The corresponding employment figures
disaggregated by type of activity start in 1970, so the series we generate for
productivity by sector only extend back to that year.
Finding operational counterparts to the traded and non-traded aggregates
in equation (1) is not an easy task. The national accounts statistics of the
OECD provides a breakdown of total value added into ten subsectors ranging
from manufacturing to wholesale and retail trade. We have designated two
subsectors as traded:
manufacturing, and
agriculture, hunting, fishing, and forestry.
P. third subsector, mining and quarrying, undoubtedly has a large traded
component, but this category includes energy products with prices very
sensitive to OPEC price policy. Since we are interested in the relative
impact of technological change on the traded and non—traded sectors, we chose
to exclude any energy—intensive subsectors. The non—traded sector includes
six of the remaining seven subsectors, but excludes one category, electricity,
gas and water, because of its energy content. The non-traded subsectors are:
construction,
wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels,
transport, storage and communication,
finance, insurance, real estate and business services,
community, social and personal services, and
government services.
The division chosen is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. The manufacturing
subsector, for example, includes goods which never enter into international
trade. But this division is, in our judgement, the best available. The value
added deflators for traded and non-traded goods are weighted averages of the
subsector deflators, the weights being the relative size of value added in
1980.These same weights are used for all series subsequently defined for
the traded and non-traded sectors.
-12—The real exchange rate based on the GDP deflator
The GDP deflator is a broad based price series reflecting price movements
in both traded and nontraded sectors of an economy. Real exchange rates based
on this series might be expected to provide a fairly reliable guide to the
relative competitiveness of national economies.In comparisons between Japan
and the United States, however, the GDP deflator offers a very distorted view
of relative competitiveness because the traded and nontraded sectors follow
quite divergent paths in one economy compared to the other. We begin by
examining broad trends in real exchange rates as well as trends in
productivity by sector.In Table 1 below, we report percentage changes in
these series obtained by fitting each series to an exponential time trend over
the 1973—83 period. The year 1973 is chosen as the starting point for the
trend calculations because it is after the realignments associated with the
Smithsonian Agreement on exchange rates and coincides with the advent of
general floating in early 1973.8 The variables appearing in Table 1 are
defined as follows:
Rv the rea.l exchange
RVT: the real exchange
the GDP deflator,
F1 -H.:
productivity in the nontraded sector relative to the traded
sector in the United States,
—
HT:productivity in the nontraded sector relative to the traded
sector of Japan.
rate based on the GDP deflator,
rate based on the traded goods portion of
-13-TABLE1.REAL EXCHANGE RATES BASED ON GDP DEFLATORSAND
PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCESBETWEEN SECTORS
(Trend Movements from1973 to 1983)
Rv RVT (Hj H) (HNNT)
—0.3% 26.7% —13.2% —73.2%
appreciated much relative to the yen over the 1973-83 period.9 Focusing on
the traded sector, in contrast, leads to a very different conclusion. With a
real appreciation of the dollar by 26.7% (or a real appreciation in
manufacturing alone of 35.1%), it is evident that the realignment following
the Smithsonian Agreement has been undone by the strength of the dollar.
(2) What accounts for this divergence between the real exchange rates
based on the GDP and traded goods deflators? The relatively small real
depreciation in terms of the GDP deflator is explained by relative
productivity movements in the traded and nontraded sectors of the United
States and Japan. As equation (5) indicates, the difference between Rv and
RVT is a function of relative prices or, given similar sectoral wage trends,
The percentage changes in these series are quite revealing.
(1) Over this period, the real exchange rate based on the GDP deflator
followed a much different path than the real exchange rate based on the
deflator for traded goods alone. From 1973 to 1983, the yen appreciated in
terms of the GDP deflator by 0.3%, while the real exchange rate defined in
terms of the deflator for traded goods alone rose by 26.7%, representing a
sizable real depreciation of the yen or real appreciation of the dollar over
the eleven year period. (This appreciation of the dollar is exceeded even
further by the rise of 35.1% in the real exchange rate based on the deflator
for manufacturing alone). If we were to focus exclusively on an aggregate
index like the GDP deflator, we would conclude that the dollar had notrelative productivity movements in the traded and nontraded sectors of each
country.1° Productivity in the U.S. traded sector grew by 13.2% faster than
in the U.S. non—traded sector. But in Japan, productivity growth in the
traded sector was 73.2% greater than in the non-traded sector. We can use
equation (7) to calculate the trend differential between R and relative unit
labor costs in the traded sector, RULCT, based on these rates of productivity
growth. The shares of nontraded goods in total GDP in the United States and
Japan in 1980 were .733 and .657, respectively, giving a differential between
Rv and RULCT asfollows:11





The markedly higher growth differential in Japan required a substantial real
appreciation of the yen in terms of' the GDP deflator, by 38.14% according to
this calculation, to keep U.S. traded goods competitive. This relative
appreciation, however, was accomplished not by Rv falling, but by RULCT
rising. Because was nearly constant over the period, relative unit labor
costs in the traded sector, and hence the relative prices of U.S. traded
goods, rose significantly, by 38.1%. This sharply reduced the relative
competitiveness of U.S. exports.
Movements in real exchange rates over time are influenced by numerous
short term demand factors in addition to the supply factors emphasized here.
The difference between two real exchange rates, however, should be strongly
influenced by supply factors. In the case of the value added deflators, these
factors include the relative productivity movements in the nontraded and
traded sectors of each economy. Below we report a regression for equation
(5), relating the difference between and RVT to the price differential in
the nontraded and traded sectors of each country. All variables are expressed
-15-as first differences in the logs, so they can be interpreted as percentage
changes of the corresponding variables from one year to the next. The numbers
in parentheses below the coefficients are t—statistics.
Sample Period 1971—83




.708, DW =1.97, S.E. .00891
Accordingto this equation, a rise in nontraded relative to traded prices in
the United States leads to a rise in relative to RVT, while a rise in
nontraded relative to traded prices in Japan leads to a fall in R relative to
RVT. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level,
suggesting that annual movements in the real exchange rates relative to one
another are strongly influenced by sectoral relative prices.
The annual movement of R relative to RULCT is also closely related to
supply factors as suggested by equation (7). The second equation relates (the
percentage change in) R to (the percentage changes in) relative unit labor







.81414, D.W.=1.55, S.E. .01411
Inthis equation, (the percentage change in) RULCT should enter with a posi-
tive coefficient close to one, depending on the markup of prices over marginal
costs, while (the percentage changes in) -HandHN -HTshould have
—16—negative and positive coefficients, respectively. All of the coefficients,
therefore, are of the correct sign, although the coefficient of (H -H)
is
not statistically significant. Fitting this equation to the trend movements
in the series reported in Table 1, we find that the gap between Rv and RULCT
grows by _L1.3% over the 1973—83 period, a little larger thanin the calcula-
tion above based on sectoral shares.13 But the implications are similar: that
the yen must appreciate significantly in real terms when measured against the
GDP deflator as a whole if traded goods are to remain competitive.
Real exchange rates based on the prices of final goods
The prices of final goods follow patterns similar to those of GDP
deflators, although in the case of the prices of final goods we have to take
into account the influence of raw materials prices and the prices of final
goods from third countries. We begin by examining trends in some of the key
series over the post—Smithsonian period as reported in Table 2. The variables
appearing in this table are defined asfollows:
Rc
real exchange rate based on the consumer price index,
Rpj: real exchange rate based on the wholesale price index,
RVT:





relative GDP deflators for nontraded and
traded goods in the United States and Japan,
(P —vT'i -PVT):real price of raw materials in the United
States and Japan (price of raw materials deflated by the value
added deflator for traded goods).
—17—TABLE 2. REAL EXCHANGE RATES BASED ON THE WPI AND CPI INDEXES
AND RELATIVE PRICE CHANGES ACROSS SECTORS, U.S. AND JAPAN
(Trend Movements from 1973 to 1983)
Rp1
-9.0% 26.7%







12.3% 56.9% 8.0% 120.1%
Overthis eleven year period, the real exchange rate based on the OPT fell by
9% (thus suggesting a real appreciation rather than depreciation of the yen),
while all other real exchange rates rose. The real exchange rate based on the
WPI rose only however, a rate far below that based on the value added
deflator for traded goods. This pattern of much greater real depreciations of
the yen in the case of real exchange rates based on traded goods can be attri-
buted to the sharp changes in relative prices evident in the second row of the
table. The relative price of nontraded to traded goods rose much more in
Japan than in the United States. When real exchange rates for final goods are
being analyzed, the real prices of raw materials are also quite important. In
Table 2, we report a much larger increase in the real price of raw materials
in Japan than in the United States, the gap between the two countries being
112.1%. This larger increase can be attributed to two factors: the greater
increase in the local currency price of raw materials in Japan than in the
United States (greater by 146.7%),andrelatively greater productivity in the
traded sector of Japan which leads to a much smaller rise in the deflator for
Japan, accounting for the rest of the differential in real terms.15
Equation (12) summarizes the different influences on the real exchange
rate based on a general price index such as the CPI. To illustrate the
—18—quantitative importance of these different influences, we assign values to the
parameters appearing in equation (12), then calculate the trend change in
RF —RVTconsistent with the trend changes in the independent variables
appearing in Table 2. We have no estimates of RT, the real exchange rate
based on the traded prices of the United States and Japan. (Japan has an
export price series for the 1973—83 period, but the United States only has
series for individual commodities extending back that far). For this reason,
the calculations below are based on the assumption that relative traded prices
are constant. Thus in effect we are asking how much would RE have to vary
relative to RVT in order for traded prices to be held constant over the 1973-
83 period.16
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the production and consumption
parameters are identical for the United States and Japan. The values we
assign to the parameters underlying those in (12) are asfollows:17
a2 .6, CT1 .65, cT2 .2, CT3 .15,
CN1 .8, cN2 =.15, cN3 .05.
With these parameters and the actual trends in the relative prices appearing
in equation (12), we find that RE -RVTshould have fallen by 37.1% over the
1973—83 period. This contrasts with an actual gap between the real exchange
rate based on the CPI and that based on the value added deflator for traded
goods of 357%•18 The actual gap was achieved not by a fall in RE, but
primarily by a rise in RVT.
We cannot estimate equation (12) as written since we have no series for
RT, the real exchange rate based on the final pricesof traded goods.
Instead, we estimate a modified version of (12) with RTomitted.19 All
variables in the equation are expressed as first differences of the logs; the
—19—GDP data are available beginning in19611,so the sample period spans nineteen
years.
Sample Period 1965—83










=.753, D.W. 1.97, S.E. .01116
The coefficients of all variables with the exception of the last one have the
correct sign, although neither of the coefficients for materials prices are
statistically significant at the 5% level. The relative sectoral prices (the
ratio of nontraded to traded prices) play a major role in this equation. The
coefficients of these sectoral prices, in fact, may be larger than they should
be given reasonable values of the underlying behavioral parameters. (Given the
parameters assumed above, the first two coefficients in the regression should
be about .6 in absolute value). The equation as a whole predicts a larger gap
between and RVT than occurred over the 1973—83 period analyzed in Tables 1
and 2. Given the trends in relative prices for the independent variables in
the estimated equation and the coefficients estimated above, there should have
been a real appreciation of Rc relative to RVT of 145.6%, whereas in fact the
relative appreciation was 35.7% (a sizable one, nonetheless). Despite the
likely overestimation of the effects of Japanese sectoral prices, the equation
reported explains a large proportion of the relative movement of the two real
exchange rates, especially considering the fact that equation 12 on which this
estimated equation is based abstracts from many short term influences on
relative prices.
-20-Implications for relative wage growth
The tremendous growth in productivity in Japan, even if largely confined
to the traded goods sector, has meant rising wages and standard of living in
that country. In this section we use the model developed earlier to study the
growth of wages in Japan relative to that in the United States implied by
productivity growth and other factors affecting the relative competitiveness
of traded goods in the two economies. We pose the following question: if
during the 1973-83 period exchange rates had adjusted to keep traded goods
competitive, what would have been the implications for relative wages in the
two countries? The answer to this question differs considerably depending on
whether we examine relative nominal wages or relative real wages.
We first determine the percentage change in relative nominal wages
required to keep traded goods competitive. We substitute equations (6), (3a),
and (3b) relating value added deflators to unit labor costs into equation (11)














If the real exchange rate for traded goods is held constant (for convenience
we set its log, RT, equal to zero), we can express relative nominal wages as
follows:








Nominal wages in the United States relative to Japan (both expressed in
dollars) are proportional to the following variables:
—21—H -HT:
the gap between productivity in the traded sectors of the
United States and Japan,
-H,HN -HT.the intersectoral productivity gap in each country,
—VT
—VTthe real price of raw materials in each country.
In Table 3, we list the trend changes in the five variables appearing in
equation (13) over the 1973-83 period.
TABLE 3. TREND CHANGES INPRODUCTIVITY ANDRAW MATERIALSPRICES
(Trend movements from 1973 to1983)




—13.2% —73.2% 8.0% 120.1%
The most interesting figure in this table is the huge gap of 83.1 percent
between productivity growth in the traded sectors of the United States and
Japan.
Using the figures for trend changes in Table 3, we can calculate the
change in relative nominal wages necessary to keep the relative prices of
traded goods constant over the 1973—83 period. With the same production
coefficients assumed in Section II b, the trend change in (W* +X-W)is
—55.0% (expressed as a total percentage change over the 1973—83 period). This
relative wage change could occur through a greater rise in Japanese wages than
U.S. wages when each is expressed in its own currency, or by a depreciation of
the dollar. The actual trend change in relative wages was _19.14%, which
suggests just how far U.S. wages must fall relative to Japanese wages, or more
realistically, how much the yen must appreciate relative to the dollar, to
keep the real exchange rate for traded goods constant over the 1973—83 period.
The required growth of real wages is not as divergent as the growth of
nominal wages because the growth of real wages in Japan is held down by the
-22-slow productivity growth in the nontraded sector. To calculate the growth of'
real wages in one country relative to the other, we must first obtain an
estimate of the rate of change of the consumer price index consistent with the
real exchange rate for traded goods remaining constant. We substitute into
equation (9) expressions for the gross output prices of traded and nontraded
goods (ba and lOb) and use equations (3a) and (3b) to express relative value
added deflators in terms of productivity differentials. We then set the real
exchange rate for traded goods equal to zero (as well as the relative price of
third country goods) to obtain an expression for RE (or its empirical
counterpart, Rc).















Using the coefficients assumed earlier, we find that in order for the real
exchange rates for traded goods to remain constant, the real exchange rate for
the CPI (Rc) must fall by 17.7%.






IfRc falls by 17.7% over the 1973-83 period, then real wage growth in Japan
must exceed that of the United States by 37.3%, a sizable amount but
considerably smaller than the differential for nominal wages (55.0%). In both
countries, the slow rate of growth of productivity in the nontraded sector
holds down the growth of real wages. But the imbalance between productivity
growth in the two sectors of Japan is so great that the real exchange rate
based on the CPI must fall significantly in order to keep traded goods
—23-competitive. This dampens the growth of real wages in Japan relative to the
United States.
The manufacturing sector
Since such a large proportion of the traded sector consists of
manufacturing goods, it is useful to examine manufacturing in more detail.
There is considerable variation in productivity growth and competitiveness
among the subsectors of manufacturing in the United States and Japan. This
variation is superimposed on the trends within the manufacturing sector as a
whole, so that some subsectors in the United States might fare well even in
recent times when the dollar has been overvalued while other subsectors might
suffer even during times of undervaluation.
The most extensive data providing a breakdown of manufacturing into
subsectors are drawn from the GDP accounts of the United States and Japan.
These data give a nine—sector breakdown for nominal and real GDP as well as
employment, so we are able to construct real exchange rates based on value
added deflators and productivity measures on a disaggregated basis.2° The
nine subsectors are listed in Table 4 together with the weights in the U.S.
and Japanese GDP's. The third subsector, "Wood and wood products, including
furniture", is of negligible importance for Japan, so we have omitted this
subsector from our analysis. Subsector eight, "fabricated metal products,
machinery and equipment," represents Lt4% of U.S. manufacturing and 50.3% of
Japanese manufacturing, so the relative competitiveness of that subsector is
of particular importance.TABLE 14. LIST OF SUBSECTORS FOR MANUFACTURING
1: Food, beverages and tobacco
2: Textile, wearing apparel and leather industries
3: Wood and wood products, including furniture
14: Paper and paper products, printing and publishing
5: Chemicals and chemical petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products
6: Non—metallic mineral products except products of petroleum and coal
7: Basic metal industries
8: Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
9: Other manufacturing industries
M: Total for manufacturing
GDP weights for 1980:
Sector 1 2 3 14 5 6 7 8 9
U.S. .113 .065 .0143 .087 .1140 .029 .069 •1414Q .015
Japan .081 .037 .000 .023 .096 .029 .104 .503 .126
We begin by examining the real exchange rates or relative price for each
subsector of manufacturing. These are illustrated in Figure 1 for eight
subsectors as well as for manufacturing as a whole. In this figure, a rise in
the real exchange rate or relative value added deflator for a given subsector
represents a real depreciation of the yen or a gain in Japanese
competitiveness in that subsector. In manufacturing as a whole, the real
exchange rate based on the value added deflator rose by 35.1 (measured by
fitting the real exchange rate series to a trend between 1973 and 1983). As
Figure 1 illustrates, this trend for manufacturing masks a wide variation
across subsectors. At one extreme, subsector one representing food saw a real
appreciation of the yen by 30.8% over the 1973 to 1983 period. But at the
other extreme, subsector eight registered a real depreciation of 67.5%. This
pattern across subsectors reflects shifts in comparative advantage as Japan
increased its competitiveness in machinery and equipment, for example, at the
expense of food, textiles, and other less technologically advanced products.
—25—These shifts in comparative advantage are most easily seen if we imagine
that the real exchange rate for manufacturing as a whole had remained constant
over the period; in that case, the real exchange rate for subsector 1 would
have fallen by over sixty percent, while that for subsector five, representing
chemicals and petroleum products, would have remained constant and that of
subsector eight would have increased by about thirty-five per cent.In the
United States, these shifts in comparative advantage would have implied shifts
of employment within the manufacturing sector rather than necessitating net
shifts out of manufacturing into the nontraded sector. These shifts within
manufacturing would not necessarily have involved shifts in employment out of
subsector eight, since relative prices are only one determinant of employment
and since the United States could have maintained a price advantage relative
to other competitors.
The pattern of real exchange rates across subsectors is closely related
to relative productivity growth in the two countries. Figure 2 shows
productivity growth in the United States and Japan measured as a trend over
the 19'T3-83 period for the eight subsectors as well as manufacturing as a
whole. In all but two subsectors, productivity growth in Japan exceeds that
of the United States in the same subsector, in several cases by large
percentages. But the magnitude of the gap varies widely. In subsector 9,
that gap is only 22% over the eleven year period, while in subsector 8 the gap
is 155% (productivity growth being 178% in Japan and 23% in the United
States). For manufacturing as a whole, the gap is 86%.
The magnitude of the gap between productivity growth is important because
it helps to determine how much relative unit labor costs vary between the two
countries. The behavior of each sectoral real exchange rate, in turn, should
be influenced very strongly by relative unit labor costs in that sector, and
—26—thus indirectly by relative productivity growth. This influence is confirmed
by a comparison of the sectoral patterns in Figures 1 and 2. The two
subsectors where U.S. productivity growth exceeds that of Japan, food and non-
metallic mineral products (sectors 1 and 6), for example, are those where the
relative price of U.S. goods has fallen over the same period.Similarly, the
subsector where the gap between Japanese and U.S. productivity growth is
greatest,subsector eight, is the one experiencing the greatest rise in U.S.
prices relative to those of Japan.
Over the 1973—83 period, changes in real exchange rates reflected
macroeconomic factors in addition to the structural influences emphasized in
this paper. But the behavior of each sectoral real exchange rate relative to
the real exchange rate for manufacturing as a whole should be primarily
determined by differences in productivity growth. To examine this
relationship, we modify equation (3a) so that it explains the value added
deflator for manufacturing as a whole or, alternatively, each subsector of
manufacturing. Define RVM, as the real exchange rates for manufacturing
and for subsector i, respectively. Then the difference between these real
exchange rates can be expressed as follows:







Subsector i will experience a greater rise in its real exchange rate to the
extent the U.S. wages rise relatively faster in that subsector than in
manufacturing as a whole (or Japanese wages rise more slowly). Similarly, the
growth in will exceed that of to the extent that Japanese productivity
growth in that subsector exceeds that for manufacturing as a whole (or U.S.
productivity growth falls short in that subsector).
—27—We have no reliable data for wages by subsector. But we can compare
productivity growth in subsector i with that for manufacturing as a whole as
well as the corresponding real exchange rates. Using the trend changes in
these variables calculated previously (and reflected in Figures 1 and 2), we




over the 1973-83 period. The correlation between these two series
over the eleven year period is .906. This suggests that the pattern of
changes in relative sectoral real exchange rates is strongly influenced by the
pattern of productivity growth across sectors. The relative price changes
that have occurred in the manufacturing sectors of these two countries,
therefore, are longer term phenomena which will persist even if the current
misalignment of the dollar is corrected.
CONCLUSION
This paper has provided estimates of the effects of relative productivity
growth on real exchange rates and relative wage growth in the United States
and Japan. With Japanese productivity growing 73.2% faster in its traded
sector than in its nontraded sector over the 1973-83 period, real exchange
rates based on broad price indexes needed to adjust sharply to keep U.S.
traded goods competitive. Since the adjustment of these real exchange rates
has been minimal at best, U.S. traded goods have become much more expensive
relative to Japanese goods. To maintain the competitiveness of the U.S.
traded sector, the real exchange rate based on the GDPdeflatorwould have had
to fall by almost 140% relative to unit labor costs in the traded sector during
the 1973-83 period. Similar adjustments would have had to occur in the real
exchange rate based on the CPI and in relative nominal and real wages in the
two countries. The recent misalignment of the dollar has prevented such
adjustments. If U.S. traded goods are to regain their earlier competitiveness
-28-relative to Japanese traded goods, then the yen must appreciate considerably
(relative to 1983 levels) when measured in terms of any broad-based price
indexes.
Even if such a major adjustment in relative prices occurs, we will be
left with equally large changes in competitiveness within the manufactured
sector due to productivity differentials between subsectors of
manufacturing. Japanese productivity growth in machinery production, for
example, is nothing short of phenomenal (150% above the United States over the
1973—83 period). These major shifts in relative prices taking place rJjthjfl
the manufacturing sector compound an already serious problem of relative price
adjustment.
-29-FOOTNOTES
*prepared for the Conference on Real-Financial Linkages in Open
Economies, American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., January 30-31,
1986.I would like to thank the discussant of this paper, Rachel McCullough,
as well as William Branson, Barry Eichengreen, Koichi Haniada, Paul Krugman,
Robert Lipsey, and Charles Pigott for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft.I would especially like to thank J. David Richardson for providing
many useful suggestions concerning both content and presentation.
1Officer (1976b) provides a detailed description and critique of previous
empirical studies. For more general studies of PPP, see the survey by Officer
(1976a), Kravis et al. (1975), as well as the papers in the symposium on
purchasing power parity in the May 1978 issue of the Journal of International
Economics.
2TJnlike Hsieh's study, most previous tests used cross-section data and
focused as much on the level of the exchange rate as on its rate of
depreciation.
31n any case, with different cross—country relative price changes between
sectors, PPP cannot hold for more than one type of price index.
Marston and Turnovsky (1985) develop a two—level production function
model in which value added has a Cobb—Douglas form and gross output a CES form
(so that the elasticity of substitution between value added and raw materials
can be below one).A linearization of the CES function results in an equation
in the percentage changes of the variables very similar to those presented
here.
5There is an interesting parallel between the traded-nontraded model and
a model of three traded goods developed by W. Arthur Lewis (1978). The three
traded goods in Lewis's model are primary commodities (produced by a
-30-developing country), manufactures (produced by a developed country), and an
agricultural good such as wheat (common to both countries). In both models,
productivity in producing the common good determines wages in the respective
economies and, indirectly, prices for the other good.I am indebted to
William Branson for pointing out this parallel.
6We might also have allowed for different price indexes for world goods
imported into Japan and the United States, respectively.
7To obtain equation (12), first substitute equations (9)and(11) into
the expression RF —RVT (RF -RT)
+(RT
-RvT).In the resulting equation,
replace PN - andP —Pby their value added counterparts using equations






8Wedo not attempt to assess whether the yen and dollar were in
equilibrium in 1973, nor to measure the current equilibrium value of the yen—
dollar exchange rate. Artus and Knight (19814) and Williamson (1985) discuss
some of the conceptual problems involved in determining the equilibrium value
of an exchange rate.In measuring trend changes in real exchange rates over
the 1973—83 period, we are instead trying to assess the impact of differential
productivity trends on movements in real exchange rates relative to one
another.
9me corresponding figure of 149.3overthe shorter period from 1978 to
1983 is more alarming, but that is measuring the appreciation of the dollar
from a period of unusual weakness.
°There are no reliable data on wages in the nontraded sector of the
economy, so the growth in the wage differential between sectors is omitted
from the equations described below. If labor is mobile between sectors, or if
bargaining over wages is strongly influenced by wages in the other sector, any
—31—growth in intersectoral wage differentials should be small compared with the
gap in productivity growth rates between sectors.
11The share of nontraded goods in total GDP, represented by the
coefficients g* and g in equations (5) and (7), is likely to change through
time as relative productivity differentials reduce traded prices relative to
nontraded prices. Equation (7), therefore, will hold only as an approximation
even if the markup of prices over unit labor costs is constant over time.
121n the measurement of relative unit labor costs, we employ U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on hourly compensation in manufacturing which
are among the most reliable data available.
13The coefficient of RULCT is not significantly different from one at the
5% level. If we set this coefficient equal to one, the implied change in
relative to RULCT is -38.3%, almost identical to the figures based on sectoral
shares.
lI4The CPI and WPI indexes as well as the spot exchange rate (period
average) are taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. The
prices of raw materials, which include fuel as well as other materials for
processing, are taken from the disaggregated wholesale price statistics of
each country.
15The smaller increase in raw materials prices in the United States can
be attributed in part to the price controls on petroleum products which were
maintained through much of the period, although it is doubtful that this
factor alone could account for such a large differential between the United
States and Japan.
l6The relative prices of traded goods between third countries and the
United States are also assumed constant.
—32—17The share of nontraded goods in GDP is about 0.7 in both countries, so
we assign a value of 0.6 to its share in gross output. We allow nontraded
goods to play a somewhat larger role in traded goods production than vice
versa to reflect the relatively larger service component of traded goods.
Notice also that the share of raw materials in gross output is larger in the
traded than in the nontraded sector.
18The gap between the real exchange rate based on the wholesale price
index and that based on the value added deflator for traded goods is only
22.3%, but the WPI is heavily weighted toward manufacturing goods.
19RT should have a relatively small effect on the differential,
Rc -RVT,since the coefficient c5 should be small. Its omission from the
equation, therefore, should not make much difference. The third country price
variable is even less likely to be important in an equation explaining
bilateral exchange rates. (See the coefficient which is equal to the
difference between the country coefficients). When we proxied RT with RVT,
the real exchange rate based on the value added deflator for traded goods, the
coefficient of RVT (.022) was statistically insignificant (with a t—statistic
of .3)41) and the remainder of the equation remained almost unchanged. The
adjusted R-squared fell from .753 to .737.
20The disaggregated GDP data are undoubtedly of less uniform quality than
the aggregate GDP data, but the broad trends in these data should be
instructive, nonetheless.
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